Political participation in its “extreme” Middle Eastern context
Despite the preponderance of research on violent extremism and prevention and control policies in general, the key concepts generated by this discipline are problematic because they are often normatively loaded and empirically imprecise. To provide a better understanding of the subject of violent extremism, both scientific and in public policies, we have chosen to engage in dialogue within this webinar, researchers, stakeholders and practitioners whom we call “from the inside”, who question the construction of radicalization and violent extremism within political relations in the MENA region.
Our objective is to constitute a new and original approach, from the bottom, to understand the different realities of violence, radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, by comparing, confronting and criticizing the different public policies and the different approaches implemented to tackle the phenomenon of violent extremism in the studied states. Beyond radicalization and violent extremism, the question of civil, armed, military and political engagement and participation since the Arab revolts will be posed in an articulation between the local, the national and the global.
We seek to understand how the relations between political actors within states located in the MENA region are articulated with regional issues; how past and present political conflicts are played out between national actors and permanently redraw the map of political and community affiliations, both in discourse and in practice. Local, national and regional contexts will thus be studied as catalysts for political relations between (state and non-state) actors in the region.
Webinar format and research axes
On the basis of a meeting every three weeks, we will meet starting from April 2021 around a communication based on a country research work, complemented by the intervention of an activist, practitioner or stakeholder shedding light on the issues raised, and leaving plenty of room for collective discussion.
Several themes and areas of research will be addressed during the sessions:
Area 1. Commitment, governance and policies
- Militant careers, how does one become a political actor in this region of the world? What is political activism built on or what is the trajectory of political actors in the countries of the region?
- The relations between dominant political actors, the opposition and marginalization?
- Relationship between political institution, partisan institution and religious institution (duplication, alliances, conflicts…)?
- Modes of government, political discourse and practices…
Area 2. Law, fight against terrorism and penitentiary institution
- The impact of anti-terrorism laws on the treatment of violent extremism and on the organization of prisons: emergence, strengthening and extension of a specific legal framework reconfiguring the relations between justice, police, army and intelligence.
Area 3. media treatment of political and power relations
Area 4. Citizenship vs. sectarianism: public action, self-awareness, new ways of participation and political organization
The webinar will be held in the three languages, Arabic, English and French.
Next Session
Session 13
13 janvier 2022 à 17h (Paris)
To Rebel or not to Rebel? Sectarian belonging and Political Change
by Adham Saouli, Senior Lecturer, University of St Andrews
Like all revolts, the Arab uprisings of the last decade have stirred passions, disrupted orders, and generated imaginations of better political futures. In the heterogeneous societies of Iraq and Lebanon, the 2019 uprisings promised new political orders. It was a rare and largely spontaneous episode/rebellion where both societies reclaimed their agency against a rotten political class and system, momentarily overcoming their sectarian and political divides. But then (and not unlike other Arab uprisings, even in homogeneous societies), the protest eroded. The question on whether people should continue to rebel or not resurfaced and coincided with the reproduction of politico-sectarian divides. Why have the uprisings failed to produce their desired goals? What role does sectarianism play in this failure?
To attribute the failure of the uprisings solely to sectarianism would be an exaggeration. But to dismiss its impact would be misleading. Treating sectarianism as a form of allegiance and devotion to a sectarian community, an identity group, this talk will explore four reasons that explain the failure of the uprisings in the two cases: (1) Sectarian identities and national imaginations; (2) Politico-sectarian clientelist networks; (3) Nexus of domestic-International dynamics; and (4) Normative contestations.
Adham Saouli is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews. His disciplinary interests are in Comparative Politics and International Relations, with a focus on the Middle East region. Adopting a historical sociology approach, Saouli’s interests include state formation, politics and foreign policy of divided societies, and social movements. He is the author of the Arab State: Dilemmas of Late Formation (Routledge, 2012); Hezbollah: Socialisation and its Tragic Ironies (Edinburgh University Press, 2019); editor of Unfulfilled Aspirations: Middle Power Politics in the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2020); and co-editor of The War for Syria: Regional and International Dimensions of the Syrian Uprisings (Routledge, 2019). He is the Editor of Disruptions, a book series on social movements and revolutions by Edinburgh University Press.
Session 12
Thursday, Decembre 2 2021
5pm – 6.30pm
Assessing the Role of Women in Fighting Radicalization in Turkey
Women’s diverse motivations and various roles in radicalization processes started to receive greater attention in tandem with growing female recruitment to ISIS. The new research moved away from depicting women as passive victims and conceptualized their agency for and against radicalization as sympathizers, recruiters, perpetrators, and preventers of violent extremism (VE). Meanwhile the novel terminology of VE itself and studies on countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE and PVE) called for greater inclusion of civil society actors in a shift from the heavy focus of counterterrorism studies on law enforcement forces.
Our talk builds on these two trends and aims firstly to assess women’s varying roles vis-à-vis religious radicalization in Turkey and secondly to discuss the (possible) roles of women’s NGOs and humanitarian NGOs in devising effective CVE and PVE strategies. Drawing on the major findings of our project report entitled “Assessing the Role of Women in Fighting Radicalization”, we will discuss women’s exposure to radicalization in Turkey by identifying the push, pull and enabling factors and reflect on the interplay of economic/structural, ideological and psychological factors that transform women into sympathizers, recruiters and perpetrators. Reflecting on the extensive field research conducted in eight provinces of Turkey, our talk will also probe women’s roles in fighting radicalization alongside an appraisal of the awareness and the perspectives of VE among women’s and humanitarian NGOs, the tools, instruments, and resources they possess to reach out women at risk, and the availability of gender-sensitive programs to inform and assist women’s roles in CVE and PVE.
In our concluding remarks, we will underline the necessity of empowerment of women and women’s NGOs to address the push, pull and enabling factors of radicalization, state’s inclusive engagement with civil society networks via a well-structured National CVE Plan, whilst avoiding women’s instrumentalization in fighting against violent extremism and ensuring a truly gender-sensitive approach.
Dr. Gülriz Şen is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara, Turkey. She received her PhD and Bachelor’s degrees from Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations and holds an MA on Conflict and Sustainable Peace Studies from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where she pursued her studies as a Jean Monnet scholar. Her major academic interests comprise Middle East politics with a particular focus on international relations of the Persian Gulf and the Levant, and gender in global politics. Dr. Şen published Turkish translation of her award-winning PhD thesis from METU Press in 2016 on the theme of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States. She also authored articles, book chapters and policy briefs on Iran-US, Iran-Turkey and Iran-GCC affairs. Her recent collaborative research focuses on gendered perspectives of radicalization and violent extremism. Dr. Şen teaches courses on Global Politics, International Relations of the Middle East, Politics and Society of Modern Iran, and Gender in International Relations.
Başak Yavçan is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Migration Governance at the Hugo Observatory, University of Liège. Yavçan is also an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Turkey, where she heads an interdisciplinary program on Migration Studies. She holds a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh, Department of Political Science, has conducted research at Michigan University’s Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, at New York University and at the Northwestern University’s Buffett Institute for Global Affairs (Keyman Modern Turkish Studies). Yavçan’s research focuses on inter-group relations and public opinion, in particular regarding refugee integration, impact of immigration attitudes on Euroscepticism, immigrant acculturation attitudes and the impact of media framing on the public opinion. Lately, she has been working on the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, with a particular focus on inter-group attitudes, institutional trust, Islamic radicalization, effectiveness of local and national policies and interventions on promoting cohesion. Yavçan has conducted field research in various countries as part of national and international grant schemes, using both quantitative and qualitative methods including surveys, experiments, focus groups, in-depth interviews and content analyses.
Session 11
Thursday, November 18, 2021
5-6:30 PM (CET)
in English / en anglais
Why Reforming Islam to Fight Violent Radicalization is a Bad Idea
Following a resurgence of Islamist terrorism over the last decade, many political leaders have called for an ‘Islamic reformation’ as an approach to face this wave of religiously inspired violent radicalization. This is the case in both Muslim majority as well as Muslim minority countries. In France for example, President Emmanuel Macron has called last year for the reform of Islam in France. He wants to build an ‘Islam of Enlightenment’, a project which would include training for imams that combines knowledge about Islam with the values of the Enlightenment, as well as in-depth teaching of progressive Muslim thinkers such as Averroes and Ibn Khaldun from the 12th and 14th centuries. Macron’s project coincides with other calls for reform of the Islamic tradition in Muslim societies over the last few years such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, to what extent can this state call to ‘reform’ Islam, both in terms of rules governing the religious sphere, as well as deciding on/ reforming the religious discourse, prevent violent radicalization within Muslim communities? How is the state management of the religious arena impacting the phenomena of violent radicalization? And vice versa, does violent radicalization have implications for the state management of religion?
Georges Fahmi: Associate Fellow, the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. Previously, Fahmi was a research fellow at the Middle East Directions Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Italy. His research focuses on religious actors in democratic transition in the Middle East, the interplay between state and religion in Egypt and Tunisia, and religious minorities in Egypt and Syria.
Session 10
October 31, 2021 5:00 – 6:30 pm (paris)
Language : french
L’Imamat comme stratégie d’influence, par Fatima MOUSSAOUI
Le concept d’imamat en tant que dogme religieux et doctrine politique constitue le fondement de la stratégie d’influence iranienne depuis 1979. Les analyses des spécialistes de l’Iran se sont souvent concentrées sur la politique intérieure et étrangère iranienne, et se sont peu penchées sur l’impact de l’imamat dans sa stratégie d’influence régionale au Moyen Orient et dans le golfe Persique. À cet effet, il est nécessaire d’effectuer une lecture rétrospective du fondement de l’imamat, et saisir le dynamisme du transfert de savoir-faire imamite vers l’extérieur du pays. Cette démarche est indispensable pour comprendre les tenants et les aboutissants de la stratégie d’influence iranienne.
Notre éclairage se focalise sur les fondements de l’idéologie khomeyniste depuis la révolution iranienne de 1979. Ces fondements dogmatiques sont porteurs d’une référence religieuse à connotation spirituelle et culturelle. Cette dernière est nécessaire à saisir dans une démarche d’analyse le rôle spirituel et temporel de l’imamat comme outil de mobilisation, de recrutement et de fidélisation des jeunes et moins jeunes pour adhérer à un idéal idéologique.
The concept of the imamate as a religious dogma and political doctrine has formed the basis of the strategy of the Iranian influence since 1979. Analyzes of Iranian scholars have often focused on Iranian domestic and foreign policy, and have not focused much on the impact of the Imamate in its strategy of regional influence in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf. To this end, it is necessary to make a retrospective reading of the basis of the Imamat, and to grasp the dynamism of the transfer of Imamite expertise outside the country. This is essential to understand the meets and bounds of Iran’s strategy of influence.
We will shed light on the foundations of Khomeinist ideology since the Iranian revolution of 1979. These dogmatic foundations hold a religious reference with spiritual and cultural connotations. The latter is necessary to grasp, in a process of analysis, the spiritual and temporal role of the imamat as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting and retaining young and old alike to adhere to an ideological ideal.
Fatima MOUSSAOUI prépare un double doctorat en Relations Internationales à l’UNED Madrid et en Histoire Contemporaine à l’EPHE Paris sur la guerre par procuration au Moyen Orient et dans le Golfe persique. Elle a quinze années d’expertise dans les médias en tant que journaliste, réalisatrice, productrice et chercheure. Elle a produit et réalisé plusieurs films documentaires sur les zones de conflits et post-conflits dans la région MENA, pour des diffuseurs internationaux comme Al Jazeera network, Sky News, BBC World et bien d’autres.
Comment Ansar Allah a-t-il « tenu » durant six années de guerre ? La construction d’un réseau militant, par Habiba ASHRAF SHERIF
La question à laquelle nous tentons de répondre est : dans quelle mesure la guerre yéménite fournit-elle un contexte propice au maintien de l’engagement militant au sein du mouvement d’Ansar Allah, voire même l’élargissement de ses réseaux de recrutement, et la stimulation de la « société de la résistance » ? On emprunte ce terme au Hezbollah pour désigner une forme de société construite en parallèle, inspirée du paradigme de Karbala. Par le terme de résistance il faut entendre la résistance non seulement armée, mais aussi sociale et politique, voire la résistance contre tout genre d’oppression. Dans le cas yéménite, depuis 2002, Hussein al-Houthi a cherché avec son cycle de conférences à reconfigurer les contours de la communauté chiite et à édifier une société de la résistance autour d’un programme idéologique et politique. Dans ce sens, la société de la résistance se limitait à la sphère idéologique et n’avait pas de traduction matérielle. Le déclenchement de la guerre de Saada en 2004 a marqué une nouvelle réalité militante, à travers la résistance de la communauté chiite zaydite en tant que telle, aboutissant à l’expression et matérialisation d’un « nous » collectif. Nous verrons alors comment depuis fin 2014, Ansâr Allah cherche à élargir la construction d’un réseau militant dans le Nord du Yémen.
The question we are trying to answer is: to what extent does the Yemeni war provide a favorable context for maintaining militant engagement within the Ansar Allah movement, and even expanding its recruitment networks, and the stimulation of the « resistance society »? We borrow this term from Hezbollah to designate a form of society built in parallel, inspired by the Karbala paradigm. By the term resistance we mean resistance not only armed, but also social and political, even resistance against any kind of oppression. In the Yemeni case, since 2002, Hussein al-Houthi has sought with his series of lectures to reconfigure the contours of the Shiite community and to build a society of resistance around an ideological and political program. In this sense, the resistance society was confined to the ideological sphere and had no material translation. The outbreak of the Sa’ada War in 2004 marked a new militant reality, through the resistance of the Shiite Zaydi community as such, leading to the expression and materialization of a collective « us ». We will then see how, since the end of 2014, Ansar Allah has sought to expand the construction of a militant network in northern Yemen.
Habiba ASHRAF SHERIF, Maître de conférence en sciences politiques (Faculté d’économie et de science politique – Université de Caire, FESP) et chercheure post-doctorante à l’Ecole Normale Supérieur de Paris.
Session 9
Sep 30, 2021 05:00 PM Paris
Political participation in its “extreme” Middle Eastern context
Language: Arabic
Registration link
فقدان سطوة الدولة كمحرك أساس للعنف المتطرف في عراق ما بعد داعش
أمجد رشيد
ملخص
تتناول هذه الورقة تآكل سلطة الدولة كمحرك للتطرف في العراق ما بعد انهيار تنظيم الدولة (داعش) في ٢٠١٧. ولتجاوز المفهوم الغربي للدولة، تستخدم الورقة نظرية ابن خلدون عن الدولة والشرعية والثقافة وتجادل بأن تآكل الدولة تنتج هويات فرعية، طائفية وعرقية، لتحل محل الدولة كمنتج للشرعية. الورقة تفترض جدلية بان الحرب تغير المجتمعات لان لديها القدرة على تحويل الأفراد إلى وحوش خصوصا بغياب سطوة الدولة وأنها حالة من حالات الطوارئ، فيُنظر الى الحقوق القانونية على أنها غير ضرورية، بل وخطيرة احيانا. لقد أنتجت الحرب ضد داعش وحش ميليشيا الحشد الشعبي. تسيطر الميليشيا على مناطق شاسعة من العراق، لتحل محل داعش كفاعل غير حكومي ومنتج بديل للشرعية وعقبة أمام بناء السلام. لأن العراق يفتقر ارث ديموقراطي وارث مجتمع مدني، وبسبب ارث الدولة الاشتراكية – التي تنظر الى الدولة بمنظور ابوي – منذ تأسيس الجمهورية الأولى في ١٩٥٨، تخلص الورقة إلى أنه ما لم تستعد الدولة قوتها، فإن بيئة التطرف ستكون موجودة دائمًا في العراق.
Loss of state power as a major driver of extremist violence in post-ISIS Iraq
Amjad Rashid
Lecturer at IfP-Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen (Germany), Fellow at SGIA-Durham University, Board member of Open Think Tank (OTT)
Summary
This paper examines the erosion of state power as a driver of extremism in Iraq after the collapse of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2017. To go beyond the Western concept of the state, the paper uses Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the state, legitimacy and culture and argues that the erosion of the state produces sub-identities, sectarian and ethnic, replacing the state as a product of legitimacy. The paper argues that war changes societies because it has the ability to turn individuals into monsters, especially in the absence of state power and that it is a state of emergency. Legal rights are seen as unnecessary, and sometimes even dangerous. The war against ISIS has spawned a monster of the Popular Mobilization Militia. The militia controls large areas of Iraq, replacing ISIS as a non-state actor, an alternative producer of legitimacy, and an obstacle to peacebuilding. Because Iraq lacks a democratic legacy and a civil society legacy, and because of the legacy of the socialist state – which looks at the state from a paternalistic perspective – since the establishment of the first republic in 1958, the paper concludes that unless the state regains its strength, an environment of extremism will always exist in Iraq.
دور المجاميع المتطرفة في توتير العلاقات الدولية: العلاقات العراقية-التركية أنموذج
واثق السعدون
ملخص
من المعروف أن معضلة الأمن المشتركة بين العراق وتركيا هي وجود عناصر منظمة PKK المناهضين للدولة التركية في شمال العراق. وهذه القضية قد خضعت لعقود من السنين لعدة عوامل وتحولات تاريخية وسياسية واجتماعية، بل وحتى اقتصادية، فضلاً عن خضوعها لعوامل دولية وإقليمية ومحلية. كما ان التعامل مع هذه المشكلة تباين بين رؤيات وإرادات ومواقف مختلفة، بين تركيا ما قبل وصول حزب العدالة والتنمية إلى سدة الحكم في أواخر 2002، وتركيا ما بعد 2002، وبين عراق ما قبل 2003، وعراق ما بعد 2003، وبين منطقة كردستان العراق عندما كانت خاضعة للدولة العراقية المركزية قبل أحداث 1991، وبين إقليم كردستان الذي بدء مسيرة الحكم الذاتي الحقيقي بعد 1991.أن الأسباب ( المباشرة وغير المباشرة) لهذه المشكلة، وتطوراتها التاريخية وانعكاساتها، أصبحت معروفة لجميع متابعي شأن العلاقات العراقية-التركية، كما أن اختلاف الرؤيات حول تقييم حيثيات هذه القضية، وحول تقييم تداعياتها، أصبح واضحاً للجميع أيضاً. لذلك نرى أن أي مساعي جدية بين العراق وتركيا للتوصل إلى حلول حقيقية لمعضلة وجود عناصر PKK في شمال العراق يجب أن لا تستنزف جهودها وتبدد وقتها بالتركيز على الماضي، وانما يجب أن تنطلق من الحاضر نحو المستقبل بـ »واقعية ». ان محاولة حل هذه المشكلة من خلال مراجعة واجترار معطياتها وتعقيداتها التاريخية سيكون مسعى غير مجدي، وسيقود الأطراف المعنية بإيجاد الحلول إلى متاهة وجدل عقيم غير منتهي. حيث أن هذه المشكلة تتطلب الآن مبادرة جديدة تتفق عليها الأطراف المعنية بها، لإنتاج مقاربة واقعية وموضوعية للحل، تنطوي على شعور عالٍ بالمسؤولية، تجاه المخاطر المحتملة لتفاقم هذه المشكلة أو إهمالها.
لإنضاج هكذا مبادرة، وتحويلها إلى خارطة طريق عملية لحل هذه المشكلة، هنالك مرتكزات مهمة يجب أن تستند عليها وتنطلق منها، من أهمها التحديد الواضح للأطراف المباشرة المعنية بحل هذه المشكلة، والمسؤولة عن إيجاد حلول لها، وهي الحكومة التركية، الحكومة العراقية المركزية، حكومة إقليم كردستان العراق. واستبعاد أي طرف دولي أو إقليمي يحاول التدخل في هذه المشكلة أو استثمارها لمصالح واجندات لا تخدم البلدين والشعبين العراقي والتركي.
The role of extremist groups in straining international relations: Iraqi-Turkish relations as a model
Wathiq Al–Saadoun
Arab Studies Director at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Turkey (ORSAM)
Summary
It is known that the common security dilemma between Iraq and Turkey is the presence of elements of the anti-Turkish PKK organization in northern Iraq. For decades, this issue has been subject to several factors and historical, political, social, and even economic transformations, in addition to being subject to international, regional and local factors. Dealing with this problem also varied between different visions, wills and positions, between Turkey before the Justice and Development Party came to power in late 2002, and Turkey after 2002, and between Iraq before 2003 and Iraq after 2003, and between the Kurdistan region of Iraq when it was under the rule of the central Iraqi state before the events of 1991, and between the Kurdistan region, which began the path of real self-government after 1991. The (direct and indirect) causes of this problem, and its historical developments and repercussions, have become known to all those who follow the Iraqi-Turkish relations. The differing visions about evaluating the merits of this issue, and evaluating its repercussions, became clear to everyone as well. Therefore, we believe that any serious efforts between Iraq and Turkey to reach real solutions to the dilemma of the presence of PKK elements in northern Iraq should not drain its efforts and waste its time by focusing on the past, but rather it should proceed from the present towards the future with « realism ». Attempting to solve this problem by reviewing and ruminating on its historical factors and complexities would be in vain, and would lead the parties involved to deadlock solutions and endless futile disagreements. Today, this problem requires a new initiative agreed upon by the involved parties, to produce a realistic and objective approach to the solution, involving a high sense of responsibility, to tackle the potential risks of exacerbation or neglect of this problem.
In order to bring such an initiative to maturation and turn it into a practical roadmap to solve this problem, there are important pillars that must take into consideration and start from. The most important of which is to identify the direct parties concerned with solving this problem, and responsible for finding solutions to it, namely the Turkish government, the central Iraqi government, and the Iraqi Kurdistan government. And the exclusion of any international or regional party trying to interfere in this problem or invest it for interests and agendas that do not serve the two countries and the Iraqi and Turkish peoples.
Session 8
Sep 16, 2021 at 05:00 PM (Paris)
Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective
By Bilgehan Öztürk, researcher
Registration via this link
Libya has been experiencing a volatile period since the 2011 revolution that toppled the 42-year-long reign of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Since the revolution, the country has faced state failure, the spread of militias and extremist groups, and interventions of regional and global powers. The civil war in the country and the civil war’s internal and external dynamics have further destabilised the country, leading to a regional crisis and the spread of uncertainty. The problem of violent extremism that is tackled in this work is just one of the critical aspects of Libya’s broader problems.
Violent Extremism (VE) is a social and security threat that manifests itself across all countries, regions or societies, and Libya has not been an exception. Although VE is an omnipresent phenomenon, it hits contexts such as failed states, ethnic, sectarian, religious or tribal fault lines/cleavages, civil wars, and authoritarian regimes especially hard. The cracks, which paved the way for the blossoming of VE’s root causes, were created during the reign of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi and were exposed after his toppling. These causes were further exacerbated by the Libyan Civil War that was instigated by renegade General Khalifa Haftar in 2014.
This research explores VE in Libya in its historical and social context. More importantly, the research formulates a consistent strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) based on some of the critical principles of bottom-up peacebuilding. The study’s recommendations encapsulate a synthesis of nation-building, state-building, and peacebuilding programs to address the problem of VE in a sustainable and locally-oriented approach. The objective of the strategies offered in this study is to expose both the individuals and the structural sources that paved the way for the emergence of VE in Libya.
Bilgehan Öztürk got his bachelors degree from TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara. He was awarded Jean Monnet Scholarship by Council of Europe in 2011 and completed his masters degree at Kings College London, in the Department of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies with Distinction. He was awarded Associate of Kings College (AKC) title, which is granted by Kings College London only, for his special degree on religion and philosophy. He continues his PhD studies at Middle East Technical University, in the Department of International Relations. Border security, Syrian civil war, armed non-state actors, radical groups and radicalisation are among his research interests.
29 juillet 2021, 5-6:30 PM (CET)
Politique marocaine de lutte contre le terrorisme : Quelle implication des spécificités du genre et des droits de l’homme dans le traitement des cas de femmes retournées de l’Etat Islamique ?
par Dr. Bahija Jamal & Noufal Abboud
Séance en français
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De par sa position géographique, le Maroc est confronté à plusieurs activités criminelles transnationales qui transcendent les juridictions nationales telles que le terrorisme. Pour y faire face, le Royaume du Maroc déploie, depuis de nombreuses années, des efforts importants pour mettre en place des réponses efficaces de lutte contre le terrorisme. Cependant, le Maroc est toujours sujet de menace terroristes. En outre, l’idéologie terroriste reste convaincante pour des populations vulnérables, notamment les femmes. Selon le Directeur du Bureau Central des Investigations Judiciaires (BCIJ), lors d’une analyse sur les nouveaux défis sécuritaires au Maroc en 2021, parmi les 1654 Marocains ayant rejoint les rangs de l’Etat Islamique « DAECH », depuis son émergence en 2014, le nombre de femmes est de 288, dont 99 sont retournées au Maroc. Comme le cas de plusieurs pays exportateurs de combattants vers DAECH, le retour de ces terroristes, y compris celui des femmes, constitue l’un des plus grands défis sécuritaires, humanitaires, juridiques et judiciaires pour le Maroc. Ces individus ont été formés à la fabrication d’explosifs, de poisons mortels et à commettre des attaques terroristes. Bien qu’un nombre important de femmes au sein de DAECH assume principalement les rôles traditionnellement considérés comme féminins – ceux d’épouse et de mère, éventuellement d’infirmière –, certaines parmi elles ont été endoctrinées selon des idées extrémistes et ont joué un rôle dans la propagation de l’extrémisme violent, la facilitation d’actes violents, voire même la contribution à ces actes dans leur pays d’origine, comme c’est le cas pour le Maroc. A cet égard, la diversité des rôles que les femmes peuvent jouer au sein des groupes terroristes devraient être prise en compte dans toutes les politiques publiques de lutte contre le terrorisme. Ces politiques doivent être développées aussi bien sur la base des spécificités du genre que sur le respect des droits humains.
Dans le but de débattre de l’importance des aspects du genre et des droits de l’homme dans le contexte du terrorisme au féminin, notre intervention constituera une analyse de la politique marocaine de lutte contre le terrorisme sur la base d’une approche basée sur les spécificités du genre et des droits de l’homme.
Noufal Abboud, directeur du Centre Nordique pour la Transformation des Conflits
Nous avons longtemps été guidés pour appliquer le dicton « penser globalement, agir localement ». Après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, et en référence à Jane Goodall, primatologue et anthropologue britannique, l’expression doit être plutôt l’inverse : pour être efficace, nous devons essentiellement « penser localement et agir globalement ». Penser globalement, en particulier dans le domaine de la lutte contre l’extrémisme violent au niveau mondial, peut parfois conduire au désespoir et au pessimisme, tandis que les initiatives aux niveaux local et communautaire ont montré des succès clés qui ont dissipé un sentiment d’espoir et d’optimisme sur le terrain. Ma suggestion dans cette présentation concernant les approches à l’égard de l’extrémisme violent et la menace du retour des combattants étranger et leurs familles est la suivante :
- Les menaces des groupes extrémistes violents et des combattants étrangers revenants/rapatriés au pays d’origine remet en question l’efficience et l’efficacité du domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme, en particulier dans l’établissement de preuves, la justice et la réalisation des droits de l’homme.
- La question du retour des combattants et de leurs familles met également en doute certaines boîtes à outils et déjà établies dans le cadre du domaine de la consolidation de la paix en mettant l’accent uniquement sur la crise et non sur la vie quotidienne.
- Il est nécessaire de réfléchir sur les meilleures approches locales pour traiter le problème et partager à l’échelle mondiale ce qui fonctionne et ce qui ne fonctionne pas, et non pas l’inverse.
Dr. Bahija JAMAL, maitresse de conférences en Droit international et en Relations internationales à l’Université Hassan II de Casablanca au Maroc et consultante pour la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains et contre le terrorisme à l’Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM), à L’Office des Nations Unies contre les Drogues et le Crime (ONUDC) et auprès du Conseil Européen.
Thursday June 24, 2021 at 5-6:30 PM (CET)
Language: arabic
Registration via this link
The role of state institutions in combating violent extremism, by Mohamad Sablouh, Appeal attorney in Tripoli, Director of the Prisoner Rights Center at the Tripoli Bar Association and Human Rights activist.
Defining extremist thought and violent extremist ideology, and distinguishing between them, as state institutions play a major role in addressing the phenomenon of extremism, either as a cause of its spread and expansion, or as a cause of addressing its causes and narrowing its spread before its elimination. For this, an evaluation study for the role played by the state institutions in the previous phase in combating extremism must take place in order to develop a plan that addresses the errors committed in the previous phase and establish a new phase through cooperation and networking between the relevant state institutions in cooperation with civil society.
دور مؤسسات الدولة في مكافحة التطرف
التعريف بالفكر المتطرف والفكر المتطرف العنيف، والتمييز بينهما حيث تلعب مؤسسات الدولة دوراً كبيراً في معالجة ظاهرة التطرف، فإما أن تكون سبباً في انتشارها وتوسعها وإما أن تكون سبباً في معالجة أسبابها وتضييق رقعة انتشارها تمهيداً للقضاء عليها، من أجل ذلك لابد من إجراء دراسة تقييمية للدور الذي لعبته مؤسسات الدولة في المرحلة السابقة في مكافحة التطرف لضع خطة منهجية تعالج الأخطاء المرتكبة في المرحلة السابقة وتؤسس لمرحلة جديدة عبر التعاون والتشبيك بين مؤسسات الدولة المختصة بالتعاون مع المجتمع المدني.
The Public Will to counter Violent Extremism, byHala Hamze, Appeal attorney in Beirut and PhD candidate in constitutional law and President of Helping Hands Foundation.
This lecture based on the speaker’s field experience will look over the following points in order to counter violent extremism: public will; the extent of the general will of the Lebanese state; the path adopted by the Lebanese authority in combating violent extremism; the Lebanese judicial process in combating violent extremism and the opinion of civil society and human rights about it; cases helping to understand the Lebanese state’s approach to combating violent extremism
الارادة العامة في مكافحة التطرف العنيف
مفهوم الارادة العامة
مدى توفر الارادة العامة للدولة اللبنانية
المسار الذي اعتمدته السلطة اللبنانية في مكافحة التطرف العنيف
المسار القضائي اللبناني في مكافحة التطرف العنيف ورأي المجتمع المدني والحقوقي به
حالات يستنتج منها توجه الدولة اللبنانية في مكافحة التطرف العنيف
Past Sessions
Session 4
jeudi 3 juin 2021 , 5- 6:30 pm (CET)
en français
Les Salafistes ne sont pas une agrégation d’atomes identiques, par Fethi Rekik, professeur (HDR) de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique et directeur du département de Sociologie au sein de la faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de Sfax (Tunisie)
Le papier que nous nous proposons de présenter rend compte des résultats d’une enquête qualitative auprès de 8 jeunes salafistes tunisiens. Les résultats de ladite enquête publiés dans un ouvrage paru en 2020, peuvent être résumés en trois principales thèses :
La première est que le Salafisme tunisien, toutes variantes confondues, a pour origine le modèle de développement asynchrone, qui a été adopté par le Parti/Etat au pouvoir depuis l’indépendance. Ce facteur est néanmoins surdéterminé par l’ouverture du pays aux prêcheurs et aux différents discours islamistes, diffusés par les chaines satellitaires puis par les réseaux sociaux.
La seconde, est que les Salafistes considèrent que la crise du pays est une crise exclusivement morale. C’est pourquoi ils considèrent, y compris ceux engagés dans l’action politique légale, que la solution radicale réside dans l’application de la Sharia.
La troisième, sur laquelle nous insistons davantage, tente de montrer que la voie vers la communauté salafiste est plurielle et suit des trajectoires subjectives tellement diversifiées que l’on est tenté de soutenir que le Salafisme moderne est plus « individualiste » que les approches sociologiques holistes ont pris l’habitude de l’appréhender.
السلفيّون ليسوا جمعا من الذرات المتماثلة
تهدف هذه الورقة إلى عرض نتائج عمل ميداني كيفي أجريناه مع ثمانية سلفيين تونسيين. وبالاستناد إلى نتائج هذا الاستقصاء الميداني المنشورة بمؤلف صدر لنا سنة 2020، يمكن إبراز الأطروحات الثلاث التالية:
أولا: يبدو لنا أن السلفية بمختلف تنويعاتها نتاج من منتجات منوال التنمية اللامتزامن الذي اعتمد من قبل الحزب/الدولة الحاكم في تونس منذ الاستقلال. ويتضافر مع التأثير الذي مارسه هذا العامل تأثير عامل أخر وهو انفتاح البلاد على خطب الدعاة الإسلاميين المبثوثة عبر القنوات الفضائية في مرحلة أولى وشبكات التواصل الاجتماعي لاحقا.
ثانيا: يعتبر السلفيون أن الازمة التي يعيشها المجتمع التونسي هي أزمة أخلاقية بامتياز. ولهذا يرون، بمن فيهم المنخرطون في العمل السياسي القانوني، أن الحلّ يكمن في تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية.
ثالثا: نعمل عبر الأطروحة الثالثة، وهي الأهمّ، على إثبات أن الطريق نحو الجماعة السلفية متعددة وأنه لكل واحد منهم مسلك ذاتي فريد. وعلى أساس هذا التعدد في المسالك نقيم استنتاجا مفاده أنّ السلفية الحديثة من « »الفردانية » بمكان بحيث يستعصي فهمها من داخل المقاربات السوسيولوجية الشمولية المعتمدة في أغلب الأحيان. وعليه ينبغي التنويه بأن السلفية لا تقود ضرورة إلى التطرّف أو التطرف العنيف. ومع ذلك لا يمكننا إعفائها نهائيا من التشجيع على العنف المادي أو المعنوي وحتى الإرهاب، وإن بصفة غير مباشرة.
Session 3
Thursday, may 13 th 2021 at 5 pm (Paris time)
The Arab Spring revolutions … Has the alternative media missed an opportunity that is difficult to repeat?, by Hassan Abbas, Co-Editor in Chief of www.raseef22.com
The Arab Spring revolutions and the climates they generated provided a tremendous opportunity for the emergence and spread of an alternative media to traditional media that could not express the spirit of change. Indeed, many experiences emerged that succeeded in introducing many basic positive things to the media scene in the Arabic-speaking region. But was the opportunity used properly? Or could it have been better? This intervention assumes that the opportunity could have been used better, and discusses this hypothesis by trying to answer several questions: What are the main failures that alternative media have fallen into? Has it turned into a media arm for a group of society? What are the objective factors that played against this type of media?
The interaction of Arab youth with media communication and the formation of public opinion, by Ayman Mhanna, Executive Director, Samir Kassir Foundation www.skeyesmedia.org
This lecture is based on field studies conducted by the Samir Kassir Foundation in Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco.
حسن عبّاس رئيس التحرير مشارك في المنبر الإعلامي المستقلّ رصيف22 العنوان :
ثورات الربيع العربي… هل أضاع الإعلام البديل فرصة يصعب أن تتكرر؟
الملخص:
قدّمت ثورات الربيع العربي والمناخات التي ولّدتها فرصة هائلة لنشوء وانتشار إعلام بديل عن الإعلام التقليدي الذي لم يستطع التعبير عن روح التغيير. وبالفعل، ظهرت تجارب كثيرة نجحت في إدخال الكثير من الأمور الإيجابية الأساسية على المشهد الإعلامي في المنطقة الناطقة بالعربية. ولكن هل استُغلّت الفرصة كما يجب؟ أم هل كان بالإمكان أفضل مما كان؟ تفترض هذه المداخلة أنه كان يمكن استغلال الفرصة بشكل أفضل، وتناقش هذه الفرضية عبر محاولة الإجابة عن عدة أسئلة: ما أبرز السقطات التي وقع فيها الإعلام البديل؟ هل تحوّل إلى ذراع إعلامية لفئة من المجتمع؟ وما العوامل الموضوعية التي لعبت لغير صالح هذا النوع من الإعلام؟
أيمن مهنا المدير التنفيذي في مؤسسة سمير قصير www.skeyesmedia.org العنوان:
تفاعل الشباب العربي مع التواصل الإعلامي وتكوين الرأي العام
تستند هذه المداخلة الى دراسات ميدانية أجرتها مؤسسة سمير قصير في كل من لبنان والعراق وتونس والمغرب.
Session 2
Thursday, May 6th, 2021 at 5 pm (Paris time)
in arabic language
Intersectional and Killer Identities in Syria – Before and After 2011, by Iyad Kallas
The presentation will focus on the development of individual and collective identities in Syria, in correlation with the paradigm shift in the limits of freedom of speech, information disorder and radicalization, before, during and after the 2011’s uprising.
Iyad Kallas is Trainer and Consultant, specialized in media and “communication for development”. CoFounder of several alternative media platforms and communication-related projects, including “SouriaLi”, a grassroots radio station, which was created post 2011 to contribute to the documentation and development of the sociocultural and sociopolitical identities in Syria.
The impact of rural urban relations on the militarization of the Syrian uprising, by Wassim Naboulsi, (Lebanese lawyer and PhD researcher at the university of Sussex, UK).
The lecture will highlight the role of rural-urban relations in determining the outbreak and the later course of Syria’s 2011 uprising. In this context, it will focus on the militarisation of the uprising and the role of the different actors in this outcome. It will briefly review the history of these relations since the 1960s until the eve of the uprising. Against the main current within the existing literature on the Syrian conflict, the lecture will show that the conflict should not be perceived as a rural uprising against urban privileges. Such understanding of the conflict is underpinned by several problematic assumptions that will be discussed in the lecture.
Alternatively, I will highlight the fact that the 2000s Syria witnessed a reconfiguration of rural-urban relations that served the interests and aspirations of a new generation of regime elites. Then I will argue that the conflict was between both rural and urban groups who supported the above-mentioned reconfiguration and rural and urban groups who opposed it.
Finally, the lecture will conclude the need for a systemic understanding of the rural, urban and rurban in Syria. It will also conclude that future studies should rely less on the geography of the conflict and more on understanding the demands and aspirations of the different social groups during the early days of the uprising.
إياد كلاس، الهويّات المتقاطعة والقاتلة في سوريا – قبل وبعد 2011
وجهة نظر إعلامية-توثيقية عن الهويات العابرة للطبقات في سوريا وتوصيفها وتطورها قبل وخلال وما بعد الانتفاضة السورية في 2011، وعن أثر تقاطع هذه الهويات على السوريين وعلى العالم بعد مرور عقد على أحداث 2011.
إياد كلاس، مدرب واستشاري مختص في مواضيع التواصل والإعلام وآليات « الاتصال من أجل التنمية »، وشريك مؤسس لعدة مشاريع ومؤسسات إعلامية بديلة، منها « راديو سوريالي » الذي تم انشائه بهدف توثيق تطوَر الهوية الثقافية والمجتمعية-السياسية في سوريا بعد 2011.
وسيم نابلسي (محام في نقابة المحامين طرابلس-لبنان، وطالب دكتوراة في جامعة ساسكس) ، ديناميات العلاقات الريفية- المدنية في الثورة السورية وأثرها على عسكرة الثورة
ستضيء المداخلة على دور العلاقات الريفية ألمدنية في انطلاقة الثورة السورية وفي تحديد مسارها اللاحق. في هذا السياق سنركز على عسكرة الثورة وعلى دور الأطراف المختلفة في هذه العسكرة. سنقدم مراجعة مختصرة لتاريخ العلاقات الريفية المدنية منذ 1960 وحتى عشية الثورة.
بعكس التيار السائد في الأدب والاعلام، سنبين أن النزاع لا يمكن تبسيطه إلى نزاع بين الريف والمدينة بالمطلق. بل سنوضح كيف ان مجريات العقد الأول من القرن الحالي في سوريا شهدت إعادة ترتيب للعلاقات الريفية المدنية بطريقة خدمت مصالح فئات معينة من أهمها الجيل الجديد من أهل السلطة في البلد .بالإضافة الى ذلك، سنوضح تاليا ان الصراع هو بين ريفيين ومدينيين مؤيدين للمنظومة الجديدة وبين ريفيين ومدينيين معارضين لهذه المنظومة.
Session 1
April, 22th from 5:00 to 6:30 PM CET
Virtual Citizenship: Saudis in Clubhouse by Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed (Visiting Professor The Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science)
Language: Arabic
Steering Committee
Marie KORTAM (Ifpo-FMSH), Mohammed SHARQAWI(FMSH)
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